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Abstract
This is a study of the open method of coordination of European Union policies. Open
coordination is studied here as a “soft” method of European policy-making from the
perspective of European governance and related networks. The method’s first field of
application were the European employment policies. The 2000 European Councils expanded
the method to several new policy fields. The Commission’s policy plans imply further
expansions of the method. It is possible to analyse aspects of the method right now and to
spell out its first evaluations. However, it is necessary to elaborate upon the analyses and
expand the evaluations while the method’s applications mature and while the method covers
further policy fields.
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I. Methods of practical European policy-making
This is a study of what is known as the method of “open coordination” of European
policy-making. The fact that the official European integration discourse indeed calls it
a “method”, indeed, gives rise to a challenge to study it as a particular method also in
research. Research on particular practices, procedures and conventions of practical
policy-making seen as particular methods of practical policy-making is relatively rare.
However, there are exceptions that thus render legitimacy to the perspective followed
in this article (e.g., Lindblom and Cohen, 1979; March and Olsen, 1995; Bemelmans-
Videc et al., 1998).
Taking the binding versus non-binding character of policy-making methods as a
criterion of distinction, it is feasible to use the metaphor of a “hard” method of the
venerable community method or acquis method of European integration. It is also
possible to project the metaphor of “soft” methods of European policy-making upon
practices, procedures and conventions that have no binding character as to their
implementation.
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After the expansion of its scope of application in 2000, the method of open
coordination has been seen as an indication of important changes in the methods
arsenal of European integration (De la Porte and Pochet, 2000, p. 11). The method has
also been seen as a “third way” between the standard “hard”  acquis method of
integration and sheer reliance on Member States’ spontaneous but uncertain
harmonisation of their policy-making (Rhodes, 2000; Mosher, 2000).
Soft methods versus hard methods of European policy-making
Wallace (2000) spells out a five-part typology of European Union policy-making
methods:
1.  The community method;
2.  The regulatory method;
3.  The intensive transgovernmental method;
4.  The multilevel governance method; and
5.  The policy coordination and benchmarking method.
The first four of the five methods rely, to a considerable extent, on binding modes of
decision-making, importantly, regulations, directives and binding decisions. In this
respect the second, the third and the fourth methods can really be seen as particular
variants of the first method. The fifth method’s typical initial materialisation consists
of recommendations and opinions of the European Council, the Council and the
Commission. Despite lacking formal force, the fifth method may have considerable
real-world force, and this is the strong point for the political analysis of also this
method.
Let us take Wallace’s typology and connect it to Scharpf’s (1996) classification of
fields of European policy-making according to the participation of the Union and
Member States (Table 1). The Table suggests some conclusions. Welfare policy fields
mostly remain Member State prerogatives. In a few welfare-related policy fields there
is now a sharing of responsibilities between the Union and Member States. All in all,
the welfare role of the Union role has typically been on the increase. The predominant
European policy-making method in the welfare policy fields consists of policy
coordination and benchmarking. Research, technological development and innovation
is a further policy field that stands out. It is another arena where the soft policy-
making methods predominate. In in some further policy fields the soft methods have
only supplementary or complementary roles. There are also policy fields where the
soft methods are hardly applied at all.
A typology of soft policy-making methods, with a European emphasis
Wallace (2000) only coins a term to refer to what are here called “soft” methods of
European policy-making. Her approach to those methods also remains rudimentary.
Schout (2001) has made a useful inventory of soft methods of European policy-
making (cf. Metcalfe, 1994; Streeck, 1995a, pp. 426-9). However, previous research
has not analysed the soft methods in a systematic way.3
Table 1: Level and method of decision-making in European policy-making.
Where decided?
How decided?
All at the EU level Mostly at the EU
level
Both at the EU and
Member State level
Mostly Member
State level
1.  Community
method
•  International
commercial
negotiations
•  Common
agricultural policy
2.  Regulatory
method
•  Internal
market/free
movement of goods,
services, persons,
capital and labour
•  Competition
policies
3.  Intensive
transgovernmental
method
•  Monetary
Union
•  Common
foreign and security
policy
•  Justice policies
•  Police
4.  Multilevel
governance method
•  Structural
funds policies
•  Cohesion
policies
5.  Policy
coordination and
benchmarking
method
•  Macroecono
mic policy
coordination
•  Supplement
s policy-
making in
policy fields
above in the
same column
•  Employment
•  Environment
•  Research,
technological
development and
innovation
•  Education
•  Method
supplements policy-
making in other
policy fields
•  Social dialogue
(on work conditions
and as labour-
management
dialogue)
•  Health
•  Social welfare
•  Some other
policy fields
Observing that policy coordination and benchmarking methods rely on information,
and observing that the reliance can be analysed according to its type and strength, it is
possible to develop a reasoned typology of elementary soft methods of policy-making
(Table 2). The typology regards methods that rely and work on information,
analogously with, but still differently from, generic policy-making. In general, the
latter assigns rights and duties to actors, transfers resources from better-off actors to
worse-off actors or channels resources towards given preferred ends. (Majone, 1993.)4
Table 2: Typology of soft policy-making methods, with a European emphasis.
Approximate expected strength of each method
Stronger Intermediate Weaker
Structural
•  Institutionalisation
of soft law legislation
•  Institutionalised
standardisation, some
benchmarking and
evaluation mechanisms
•  Institutionalisation
of giving
recommendations
Two-way •  Hard to define •  Standards
•  Some evaluations
•  Charters
Regulative
soft methods
or method
elements
One-way
•  Soft law •  General guidelines
•  Some benchmarks
•  Reference indica-
tors, other indicators
•  Some evaluations
•  Recommendations
Structural
•  Binding
accreditation
mechanisms
•  Some accreditation
and benchmarking
mechanisms
•  Institutionalised
expert exchange
•  Hard to define
Two-way •  Some accreditations •  Some accreditations
•  Some benchmarks
•  Expert exchange
•  Hard to define Redistributive
soft methods
or method
elements
One-way •  Some accreditations
•  Incentives given by
subsidies to the
recipients to share
information
•  Some benchmarks
•  Scoreboards, league
tables
•  Unilateral
secondment of experts
•  Hard to define
Structural
•  Hard to define •  Framework pro-
gramming of activities
•  Observatories
•  Some international
organisations
•  Advisory
committees and working
groups
•  Information
networks with contact
points
•  Information
gateways
Two-way •  Hard to define •  Interest group
dialogue
•  Consultation of
stakeholders
•  Work of advisory
committees and working
groups
•  Work of consortia
in framework
programmes
•  Peer reviews
•  Citizen dialogue
•  Information
exchange
•  Conferences,
seminars, colloquia,
round tables, symposia,
etc.
Allocative
soft methods
or method
elements
One-way •  Incentives given by
subsidies for recipients
to acquire or generate
information
•  Monitoring
•  Observatory
activities
•  Certain types of
applied research
•  Programmed
research, development,
education and training
•  Self-evaluations
•  Dissemination
activities
•  Unilateral
acquisition of
information5
In the typology, regulative soft methods affect normatively the addressees of
information or declare normative agreements reached between given actors.
Redistributive soft methods affect the distribution of information, the perspectives that
the users of information may apply and the cohesion of the users as to their provision
with information. Allocative soft methods increase the quantity or quality of
information available to users. The typology also takes into account that the thrust of
soft policy-making methods may be on structures and infrastructures of information,
on two-way communication, or on one-way communication. Real-world soft methods
of European policy-making may involve complex chains and combinations of more
elementary soft methods. The method of open coordination can be studied as a
combination method made up of elementary soft methods.
Governance and networks as perspectives towards soft policy-making methods
The perspective of governance promises to make the soft policy-making methods
better intelligible by offering one potential approach to European policy-making,
although it cannot replace the other approaches (Rosamond, 2000; Hix, 1998).
Despite its limits, the governance perspective can also be seen as a response to
genuine changes in the European policy-making context and as a potential source of
added value in research that adopts this perspective (Jachtenfuchs, 2001).
What governance involves is often expressed through a negation. It does not
involve hierarchies of rationalistic implementation from objectives set at the top to
implementation at the bottom to evaluation by the top. It does not involve the
atomistic situation resembling complete markets but transposed into politics with a
multitude of homogeneous actors, either. Instead, governance involves interaction
between actors in complex networks of policy bargaining, policy making and policy
implementation. (Everson, 1998; Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999a; Kohler-Koch,
1999; Sibeon, 2000.)
In networks, results of policy-making are not legitimised only through authority as
in hierarchical policy-making or in a political version of the “invisible hand”
regulating the interaction between the actors to the effect that some kind of balance
ensues. In networks legitimisation takes place through a procedural medium. It takes
place as far as novel procedures arise that bring actors together and make them
interact where they used to remain apart, up to giving rise to solid cooperation (Eising
and Kohler-Koch, 1999b). The potential relevance of network concepts has been
acknowledged also in the study of European law to supplement approaches to
hierarchical legal regulation and pluralist approaches to legal regulation (Ladeur,
1997).
Peterson and Bomberg (1999, p. 264) propose that “soft” policy transfer through
networks of governance is becoming a major mode of advancing European
integration. Zürn (2000, pp. 192-3) proposes that as far as reasoned argumentation
arises in the networks, mutual understanding by the actors increases, common values
may arise and decision-making may proceed beyond self-interested intergovernmental
bargaining let alone the narrow bounds of decision-making defined by the unanimity
between Member States.
II. Open coordination as a method of European policy-making
Policy coordination in the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC)6
In the actual practice of European integration, procedures that bear a resemblance to
the contemporary “open coordination” have been pursued for decades. However, the
first instance explicitly called by that name also in TEC evolved as coordination of
European employment policies by Member States and the Community institutions.
The policy-making atmosphere at the establishment of the open coordination has been
called “neovoluntarism” (Streeck, 1995a; 1995b); instead of using the community
method, European policy makers preferred methods without binding force.
The legal instruments that make the formal framework for the open coordination of
the European employment policies are found in TEC together with norms on other
types of European policy coordination:
1.  Non-compulsory, open coordination of the employment policies (TEC, Art. 3,
125-30);
2.  Non-compulsory economic policy coordination (Art. 4, 98-9, 202);
3.  Compulsory policy coordination, far removed from open coordination (Art. 34,
280);
4.  Policy coordination related to compulsory policy coordination (Art. 35, 46-7);
and
5.  Other non-compulsory policy coordination, yet without explicit reference to
open coordination (health, Art. 152, trans-European networks, Art. 155,
industry, Art. 157, research and technological development, Art. 165,
development cooperation, Art. 180).
The rise and the policy-making context of open coordination
The open coordination of the employment policies and economic policy coordination
each have a history of their own (Johansson, 1999; Goetschy and Pochet, 2000;
Goetschy, 2001). The policy-making context of the open employment policy
coordination has been made up of three related processes of policy development.
Moreover, influences have emanated from the Stability and Growth Pact of the 1997
Amsterdam European Council resolutions and the European Employment Pact drawn
up according to the conclusions of the 1998 Vienna European Council. The three
related, overlapping processes have the following character (COC, 1999):
•  The  “Cologne process” aims at a cooperative macroeconomic policy mix
between Member States, including smooth interaction between the various
macroeconomic policy instruments.
•  The  “Luxembourg process” defines a coordinated employment strategy
(European Employment Strategy, EES) within a framework made up of
Employment Guidelines, decided upon by the council, and National Action
Plans, NAPs.
•  The “Cardiff process” charts a path of economic reforms and the maintenance
of a high quality of the public finances in Member States. The process has also
given rise to structural indicators on the economy of each Member State.
The open coordination of the employment policies is, explicitly but mutatis mutandis,
modelled according to economic policy coordination. The procedure of economic
policy coordination is made up of a set of definite steps (Appendix 1). Despite the
similarities in procedure between economic policy coordination and employment
policy open coordination, the former is not called open coordination in European7
policy discourse. The innovation diffusion from economic policy coordination to
employment policy open coordination becomes visible in the conclusions of the
extraordinary 1997 Luxembourg European Council on employment (LUC, 1997,
point 16):
In a similar way to the multilateral surveillance principle applied in the economic
convergence process, the Member States will each year send the Council and the
Commission their national employment action plan, together with a report on the manner
of its implementation.
Further aspects of the open coordination of employment policies
TEC Art. 125 defines the open coordination of the European employment policies as
an ongoing process instead of the implementation of decisions:
Member States and the Community shall … work towards developing a coordinated
strategy for employment… .
TEC gives the Community the roles of encouragement of cooperation between
Member States and support and complementation of activities. TEC also gives the
Council the possibility to initiate incentive measures towards Member States. Beside
the European Council, the Council, the Commission and Member States, the open
coordination of the employment policies involves a network of other actors. They are
the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, the European
Parliament and the advisory Employment Committee.
TEC defines a specific procedure for the open coordination of the employment
policies. In general, the procedure of employment policy coordination is lighter than
its equivalent in economic policy coordination (Appendix 1).
The spring 2000 extensions of open coordination
In the Lisbon presidency conclusions, there is a strategy outline to prepare Europe for
a knowledge-based economy, modernising the European social model, and sustaining
the healthy economic outlook. The conclusions give open coordination a particular
role (LIC 2000, point 6, original emphasis):
Implementing this strategy will be achieved by improving the existing processes,
introducing a new open method of coordination at all levels, coupled with a stronger
guiding and coordinating role for the European Council to ensure more coherent strategic
direction and effective monitoring of progress.
The Lisbon conclusions include a specification (LIC, 2000, point 37; cf. the typology
of elementary soft policy-making methods in Table 2):
(The) … open method of coordination … involves:
-  fixing guidelines for the Union combined with … timetables for achieving the goals
which they set in the short, medium and long terms;
-  establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and
benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member
States and sectors as a means of comparing best practice;8
-  translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting
specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional
differences;
-  periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning
processes.
The Lisbon conclusions further specify the method as regards the inclusion of actors
with definite features of network creation (LIC, 2000, point 37):
A fully decentralised approach will be applied in line with the principle of subsidiarity in
which the Union, Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the social
partners and civil society, will be actively involved, using variable forms of partnership. A
method of benchmarking best practices on managing change will be devised by the
European Commission networking with different providers and users, namely the social
partners, companies and NGOs.
The Feira conclusions spell out an extended scope of policy areas covered by open
coordination or elementary soft policy-making methods that make part of open
coordination. The conclusions obliged the Commission to present a follow-up report
on the proposed approach for indicators and benchmarks to the Spring 2001
Stockholm European Council. (FEC, 2000, point 38; Appendix 2; Commission,
2001a.)
Note that health care was not explicitly mentioned in either the Lisbon or the Feira
conclusions despite the explicit TEC clause on public health policies. The exclusion is
all the more interesting given that the Commission had a major study on health policy
coordination published in the very year 2000 (Palm et al., 2000; cf. Randall, 2000;
2001).
Special steps towards open coordination of social policies: the Social Policy Agenda
The Nice Treaty amended TEC Art. 137 by adding combat against social exclusion
and the modernisation of social protection systems as activities that the Community
may support and complement. The open coordination of the social policies received
an important element of its institutional base with the establishment of the Social
Protection Committee. This took place gradually since 1999, and finally the
Committee came to be mentioned in the Treaty of Nice, which introduced a new TEC
Art. 144. The Committee assists the Council and the Commission as an advisory body
composed of two representatives from each Member State and two representatives of
the Commission. Its main tasks are to monitor social protection policies in Member
States and the Community and to foster exchange of information, experience and
good practices between Member States and between them and the Commission.
The Nice Council of 2000 took a decision on the European Social Agenda (NIC,
2000; Commission, 2000a; here, “ESA”). ESA involves priorities for a five-year
period and strategic guidelines for various social policy areas. It is to be followed up
by the means of a scoreboard, which the Commission has to make available to the
Council by the end of each January (SEC, 2001, point 52). ESA also aims at “meta-
coordination” between the two policy fields covered by open coordination and the
economic policy coordination to ensure that the costs of no policy field are
externalised into other policy fields.
In the three policy fields that it takes up, ESA presupposes good quality of public
finances, good quality of work and workplaces and good quality of social protection.
A socially minded critique might still suggest that the economic aspect has the upper9
hand, and that there are features of an instrumental subordination of the two other
aspects to the economic aspect (cf. Beck et al., 1998.) However, ESA does continue
the slow advance of European social policy-making started by employment policy-
making towards the core areas of Member State social policies (Goetschy, 2001).
The Nice Council also decided upon a specific open coordination procedure to
implement ESA (NIC, 2000, point 32; Appendix 1). However, in the implementation
all existing Community instruments shall be used (NIC, 2000, point 28):
…the open method of coordination, legislation, the social dialogue, the Structural Funds,
the support programmes, the integrated policy approach , analysis and research.
On 12 February 2001 the Council adopted a common position on a programme to
encourage cooperation between Member States to combat social exclusion, including
open coordination as the method of cooperation. Because the programme proposal
predated ESA, there is a seeming asynchrony between the two sets of measures.
(Official Journal, C 93/11, 23 March 2001.)
III. Analyses and evaluations of the extended open coordination
The constitution of open coordination of elements of soft policy-making methods
In terms of Table 2, the elements of open coordination give it the character of a
European policy-making method that mostly relies on a set of elementary soft policy-
making methods of intermediate strength. In terms of the concepts of Table 2, open
coordination involves regulative method elements in the general guidelines it consists
of and in the benchmarking exercises that are used to detect the “world class” quality
that is ultimately aimed at. However, in their actual application, the benchmarking
components if open coordination involve redistribution in the sense of assigning
worth; arranging Member States in an order of their success or compliance into
scoreboards according to the values they receive once the benchmarks that are at hand
are being applied. The role of allocative soft method elements in open coordination is
only supplementary in the various advisory bodies and consultations of stakeholders.
Open coordination may also involve soft policy-making methods with a stronger
likely impact as far as the Commission can launch incentive activities to support the
overall pursuit of the policy at hand. Finally, also some weaker elements of the soft
policy-making methods may be built into open coordination.
Towards explanations of open coordination
It is only about by 2003 that the extensions of open coordination can be studied in
full, including their success or failure in delivering what they promise. However, even
now there is no doubt that the extensions involve horizontal transfer or spillover of
policy-making methods from some European policy-making fields to further fields
(cf. Radaelli, 2000; Strøby-Jensen, 2000).
The Commission’s needs to legitimise its position and its activities provide further
explanation for the expansion of open coordination. According to Radaelli (2000), the
legitimation base of the Commission is a technocratic one; the Commission wins
technocratic legitimacy in its intergovernmental action context as a policy broker in
the “stock exchange” European policy ideas. The Commission has also been called an
“image entrepreneur” (Wendon, 1998; Atkinson and Davoudi, 2000, 430), which10
meets the challenge to master image-making in various policy fields in order to excel
where it wins advances.
The open coordination procedures provide the Commission opportunities to
enhance the policy broker and the image entrepreneur roles. However, this does not
rule out the Commission’s role as a policy initiator in open coordination policy fields
in the manner of the venerable neo-functionalist theories of European integration
(Strøby-Jensen, 2000). Related to this, open coordination can be seen as an aspect of
the Commission’s search for new roles in a maturing Union, where the expansion and
diversification of its activities is likely to become subject to diminishing returns
(Smith, 2000).
There are tensions between the open coordination method and the standard
community or acquis method of European integration. There was evidence of these
tensions in the committee consideration of the European Social Agenda in the
European Parliament (European Parliament, 2000).
Further explanation of open coordination can be sought from so-called advocacy
coalitions (Sabatier, 1998; Johansson, 1999). The Commission can hardly act alone,
but to have open coordination expanded it has to have the acceptance of the European
Councils and the relevant councils. Without sufficient consent and cooperation of the
Member States, the actual implementation of the open coordination procedures is
impossible and the procedures are unlikely to have substantial effects.
Behind the possibility and the need for advocacy coalitions lurks the contrary
possibility that European political cleavages in certain key issues preclude integration
(Hix, 1999). For instance, health care is a policy field that the Member States and
their citizens have turned out to be reluctant to alienate, and in education there is
evidence of the same.
Open coordination can also be seen against the backdrop of changes in political
support and the political value basis of political leadership in key Member States
(Pollack, 2000a). Open coordination has been expanding while what has been called
positive integration of defining joint European strategies for Member States and the
Union institutions (Scharpf, 1999, pp. 50-71) has won support in many of the policy
fields now covered by the method. However, negative integration (Scharpf, 1999, pp.
71-83) in the special sense of abolishing boundaries between Member State policy-
making systems has also played a role.
Supplementing hierarchical, Commission-centred explanations and pluralist
explanations referring to the need for political and policy coalitions, open
coordination can be seen against the backdrop of network governance of European
policies. Everson’s (1998) suggestions, which links to the possibility of analysing also
European law from a network perspective, might turn out to be a fruitful starting
points for further analyses.
First evaluations of open coordination
First evaluations of open coordination exist. European official documents, such as the
document including the mid-term review of the Luxembourg process (Commission,
2000b), tend to attribute improvements in the employment situation to the
coordination. However, it is hard to ascertain to what extent other reasons, such a
multi-year cyclical upswing, have brought about the apparent improvements
(Goetschy and Pochet, 2000).
According to evaluation results (Goetschy and Pochet, 2000; Goetschy, 2001),
employment policy coordination has suffered from problems:11
•  Frequently vague objectives;
•  Hard-to-define and hard-to-estimate indicators to monitor the implementation
of the objectives;
•  Discrepancies between national employment policy systems;
•  Low quality national action plans (NAPs);
•  Opaque national budget allocations for the NAPs implementation; and
•  Difficulties to make social partners interested in innovative co-operation in
Member State level.
Open coordination of employment policies deserves a more positive “process
evaluation”. It contributes to renewing processes of interaction between Member
States, to extending and improving awareness of solutions applied in other Member
States and, in the best case, it promotes governmental learning. (Cf. Sibeon, 2000,
295; Owen and Rogers, 1999, 220-238; Rose, 1993; Rist, 1994.)
Should it be possible to compare the efficiency of open employment policy
coordination with the efficiency of the economic policy coordination, the latter might
turn out to be more efficient (cf. Goetschy and Pochet, 2000, p. 4). This would by and
large have arisen from institutional reasons. These include the relationship of
economic policy coordination to the EMU and its procedures, the political stress given
to this coordination, the powerful advocacy coalitions that render their support and the
sheer weight of Germany’s monetary policy regime and its tradition. On the basis of
the Stability and Growth Pact, the EMU Member States have stability programmes,
and the non-EMU Member States, resembling the present EMU members before their
EMU membership, have convergence programmes. There is tâtonnement of each
Member State towards common economic policy objectives in a clearly stronger sense
than anything taking place in the employment policies. Last but not least, employment
policy coordination is subordinate to economic policy coordination in aspects of its
process and its substance (Appendix 1).
By early 2001, the open coordination method had also been well received in
policies or research, technological development, innovation, information society and
enterprise (Commission, 2000c; 2000d; 2000e; 2001a). However, the step from
previous procedures to open coordination has been particularly short in those policies.
By early 2001, methods that make part of open coordination continued to be
widely applied in the policy field of the internal market, where an internal market
scoreboard procedure arose as early as in 1997. On the contrary, no results related to
the open coordination procedure are being reported on policies of education despite
the elaboration of a quality enhancement and benchmarking procedure (Commission,
2000f; Lundvall and Tomlinson, 2001). Indeed, the introduction of open coordination
in education policies was delayed in a November 2000 Education Council to the
Seville European Council in March 2002 (Commission, 2001b).
IV. Mapping the future: open coordination in developing European governance
Open coordination in the Commission’s development plans
In the Work Programme “Enhancing democracy in the European Union”, defining a
path towards accomplishing a White Paper on Governance by the summer of 2001,
the Commission refers to open coordination under the heading “Promoting coherence12
and co-operation within a ‘networked’ Europe” (Commission, 2000g, p. 11, original
emphasis):
(T)he interdependence brought about by economic and monetary union is creating a
growing need for more “convergence” of national and/or regional policies, also in areas
where the Community has only limited powers. … (e)xamining more closely
proportionality between the possible forms of “convergence” and the type of problems to
be resolved. For instance, the Luxembourg process for the convergence of national
employment policies is in many respects considered to be exemplary; but on what terms
and for which areas? Is the open coordination process initiated in Lisbon likely to be able
to extend in all fields of economic and structural policy without clashing with the principle
of subsidiarity?
To prepare the White Paper on Governance, the Commission (2000h) announced the
particular aim to look at proportionality between types of policy-making problems
and the European measures to achieve convergence between Member State policies.
The Commission also announced the aim to take stock  of methods of policy
coordination that are suitable in different fields of European policy-making. Finally, it
expressed the aim to consider the potential of open coordination in the further fields
of budgetary convergence, taxation and justice and home affairs.
Studying open coordination further
There are many possibilities to continue the analysis of open coordination. First, open
coordination can be studied in comparison with any member in any of the four other
categories of policy-making methods in Wallace’s (2000) classification. Second, it is
possible to launch studies on open coordination in comparison with other soft policy-
making methods. Does it coexist with other soft methods? Where is this so? Does the
method supplement or complement the other soft methods?
Third, open coordination can be studied from the viewpoint of its actual or likely
applicability in any policy-making field. It looks particularly promising to pursue
comparative studies on its actual applications over the relevant policy fields. It is also
possible to study if different variants of open coordination arise and if they perform
differently in different policy fields. Fourth, given policy fields can be studied from
the point of view of the simultaneous application of open coordination and other
policy-making methods, including binding methods. We have seen above that in
certain policy fields such coexistence indeed is the case.
Fifth, the Commission’s (2000g, p. 11) question if open coordination clashes with
subsidiarity is worth consideration. One possibility would be to elaborate a concept of
non-hierarchical subsidiarity or network subsidiarity as suggested by Lebessis and
Peterson (2000, pp. 38-9). Such a concept of subsidiarity would focus attention on
policy communities and issue networks where a reasoned discourse is waged on
European policies at their initiation, decision, implementation, evaluation, revision
and sunset phases (cf. Falkner, 1998, pp. 42-52; Falkner, 2000). The network
maintenance would be taken care of by the European institutions, importantly the
Council with the Presidency country at its apex and the Commission. Member States,
European regions and municipalities, European interest groups and citizens would
occupy the other network roles.13
Towards comprehensive evaluation of open coordination
One possibility for evaluating open coordination in the context of European
governance offers itself in Weale’s (2000) three evaluation criteria of functional
effectiveness, transparency and deliberative rationality. The established criteria of
efficiency, effectiveness in reaching objectives and minimising negative side effects,
relevance with respect to needs and sustainability of impacts over time (Commission,
1997) can be seen as criteria of functional effectiveness.
In terms of legitimacy, functional effectiveness is a matter of technocratic
legitimacy, which has also been called output legitimacy (see Höreth, 1999, pp. 259-
61). Despite their limitations, the criteria of functional effectiveness also provide
possibilities to evaluate also European integration “by stealth” (Weale 2000, 161;
Pollack, 2000b); it is not alien to the technocratic evaluator to probe if side effects,
including integration by “stealth”, have positive or negative net impacts. The available
evaluation of European employment policies (Goetschy and Pochet, 2000; Goetschy,
2001) is largely an evaluation of functional effectiveness, although when evaluating
the inclusion of  the social partners the evaluation proceeds further.
Weale’s criteria of transparency probe how a particular procedure and its
principles and standards were actually adopted, and who actually had their say in
defining the outcome. As evaluation, this involves process evaluation (Owen and
Rogers, 1999, 220-38). The legitimacy concept related to the transparency criteria is
one of input legitimacy (Höreth, 1999, 258-9). The criteria of transparency help check
if “win-win” solutions are reached, if both the “pros” and “contras” have known what
they have supported and opposed and if they have known what they have received and
what they have contributed.
Evaluation by criteria of transparency would help check that the open coordination
procedures do not suffer from a certain potential fault. This is the fault that an
apparent openness – wide participation of actors and lack of legally binding decisions
– remains deceptive. Where so, the openness hides a factual lack of transparency in
selecting the actors, in the nature, kind and quality of the ultimate results and in the
ultimate distribution of the results among the actors. (Sibeon, 2000, 304; Peterson and
Bomberg, 1999, pp. 268-71.) The Commission acknowledges transparency problems
in developing European governance, including such problems as may ensue in
expanding open coordination (Commission, 2001c). It warns that without special
measures, the extension of open coordination may bypass legislatures and, as a fait
accompli, elevate the status of rather low-ranking national authorities.
Criteria of deliberative rationality probe why a given measure was adopted and its
alternatives rejected in political discourse, and if the participants had adequate
opportunities to take up the merits and the demerits of each proposal and weigh them
against one another  (Weale, 2000, 169-70; Føllesdal, 2000; Zürn, 2000). If not
overstated (Saward, 2000), the deliberative rationality criteria involve potential to
expand towards criteria of democratic legitimacy (see Zürn, 2000). The Commission
(2000g; Lebessis and Paterson, 2000) does not ignore the deliberative aspect. It
emphasises the importance of involving the European citizens and strengthening their
role in deliberation on European questions.14
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r
i
n
g
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
a
 
s
c
o
r
e
b
o
a
r
d
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
i
n
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
1
0
.
 
M
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
 
b
y
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
s
 
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
’
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
l
y
 
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
 
o
f
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
i
g
h
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
c
o
r
e
b
o
a
r
d
1
1
.
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
 
o
n
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
s
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
m
a
y
,
 
b
y
 
Q
M
V
,
 
m
a
k
e
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
a
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
t
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
d
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
,
 
a
c
t
i
n
g
 
b
y
 
Q
M
V
,
 
o
n
 
a
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
r
o
m
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
,
 
m
a
y
 
m
a
k
e
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
(
s
e
e
,
 
e
.
g
.
,
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
,
 
2
0
0
0
b
)
N
o
t
 
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
1
2
.
 
U
l
t
i
m
a
t
e
 
s
t
e
p
s
 
i
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
N
o
 
m
e
n
t
i
o
n
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
m
a
k
e
 
a
 
j
o
i
n
t
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
t
o
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
s
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
t
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
s
 
t
h
e
 
i
s
s
u
e
 
i
n
 
i
t
s
e
a
c
h
 
s
p
r
i
n
g
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g2
0
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
2
:
 
L
i
s
b
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
F
e
i
r
a
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
e
x
p
a
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
o
p
e
n
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
L
I
C
,
 
2
0
0
0
;
 
F
E
C
,
 
2
0
0
0
)
.
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
f
i
e
l
d
P
o
i
n
t
 
i
n
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
o
c
i
e
t
y
L
i
s
b
o
n
,
 
8
T
h
e
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
d
r
a
w
 
u
p
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
r
e
h
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
e
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
A
c
t
i
o
n
 
P
l
a
n
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
,
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
n
 
o
p
e
n
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
o
f
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
v
e
s
,
 
c
o
m
b
i
n
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
'
s
 
e
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
v
e
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
i
t
s
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
"
S
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
J
o
b
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
S
o
c
i
e
t
y
”
.
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
a
n
d
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
L
i
s
b
o
n
,
 
1
3
A
s
 
p
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
n
g
 
a
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
A
r
e
a
,
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
s
h
a
l
l
 
b
e
 
e
n
c
o
u
r
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
o
p
e
n
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
o
f
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
b
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
i
n
g
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
,
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
f
o
r
 
a
s
s
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
f
i
e
l
d
s
,
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
h
u
m
a
n
 
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
c
o
r
e
b
o
a
r
d
 
b
y
 
J
u
n
e
 
2
0
0
1
.
E
n
t
r
e
p
r
e
n
e
u
r
s
h
i
p
L
i
s
b
o
n
,
 
1
5
T
h
e
 
o
p
e
n
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
o
f
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
a
p
p
l
i
e
d
.
 
T
h
e
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
l
a
u
n
c
h
 
a
 
b
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
i
n
g
 
e
x
e
r
c
i
s
e
 
o
n
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
l
e
n
g
t
h
 
o
f
 
t
i
m
e
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
i
n
 
s
e
t
t
i
n
g
 
u
p
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
,
 
t
h
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
r
i
s
k
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
e
d
,
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
 
o
f
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
c
i
e
n
t
i
f
i
c
 
g
r
a
d
u
a
t
e
s
a
n
d
 
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
t
i
e
s
.
(
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
;
o
n
l
y
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
o
p
e
n
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
)
L
i
s
b
o
n
,
1
7
-
1
8
B
y
 
2
0
0
1
 
a
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
 
m
u
s
t
 
b
e
 
s
e
t
 
o
u
t
 
f
o
r
 
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
s
i
m
p
l
i
f
y
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
a
t
 
b
o
t
h
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
.
 
C
o
m
p
r
e
h
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
t
o
 
m
e
e
t
 
a
m
b
i
t
i
o
u
s
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
f
o
r
g
r
o
w
t
h
,
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
.
 
K
e
y
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
l
r
e
a
d
y
 
b
e
e
n
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
c
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
C
a
r
d
i
f
f
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
.
 
T
h
e
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
i
n
v
i
t
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
t
o
 
s
t
e
p
 
u
p
 
w
o
r
k
 
o
n
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
o
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
2
0
0
0
.
(
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
n
o
t
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
l
y
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
i
n
o
p
e
n
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
)
L
i
s
b
o
n
,
 
2
2
-
2
3
T
h
e
 
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
t
y
 
m
u
s
t
 
b
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
 
t
h
e
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
s
u
s
t
a
i
n
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
r
e
q
u
e
s
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
u
n
c
i
l
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
,
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
e
x
i
s
t
i
n
g
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
,
 
t
o
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
a
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
b
y
 
S
p
r
i
n
g
 
2
0
0
1
 
a
s
s
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
s
 
t
o
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
a
n
d
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
a
s
s
e
s
s
i
n
g
,
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
a
b
l
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
a
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
 
c
o
n
c
r
e
t
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
t
a
k
e
n
.
(
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
,
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
o
p
e
n
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
l
r
e
a
d
y
)
L
i
s
b
o
n
,
 
2
8
T
h
e
 
m
i
d
-
t
e
r
m
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
g
i
v
e
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
i
m
p
e
t
u
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
i
s
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
b
y
 
e
n
r
i
c
h
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
g
u
i
d
e
l
i
n
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
g
i
v
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
m
m
o
r
e
 
c
o
n
c
r
e
t
e
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
b
y
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
i
n
g
 
c
l
o
s
e
r
 
l
i
n
k
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
a
n
d
 
b
y
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
n
g
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
a
c
t
o
r
s
.
M
o
d
e
r
n
i
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
-
p
e
a
n
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
m
o
d
e
l
:
 
m
o
-
d
e
r
n
i
s
i
n
g
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
p
r
o
-
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
m
o
t
i
n
g
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
F
e
i
r
a
 
3
5
-
3
6
A
t
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
m
u
s
t
 
b
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
s
t
a
i
n
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
.
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
a
t
i
c
 
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
o
f
 
w
o
r
k
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
m
a
t
t
e
r
s
 
a
t
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
w
i
l
l
 
b
e
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
e
t
t
i
n
g
 
u
p
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
P
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
C
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
e
,
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
 
d
e
b
a
t
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
o
s
e
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
a
n
d
b
y
 
e
n
c
o
u
r
a
g
i
n
g
 
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
a
n
 
o
p
e
n
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
 
o
f
 
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
m
b
i
n
i
n
g
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
p
l
a
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
 
t
o
 
c
o
m
b
a
t
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
e
x
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
.